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with judicial arguments and endorse judicial independence by rendering the decision more
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A further aim of this paper is to fulfill the knowledge gap about the migration of
proportionality analysis as a rights adjudication mechanism to Latin America and, at the same
time, make a claim for a context-sensitive approach. The hope is that judiciaries will learn from
recent pitfalls that occurred under authoritarian regimes in Latin America where decisions were
based upon excessive formality and disregard of relevant factors involved in rights claims. The
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the option of a new appraisal of its migration to Latin America.
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PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AS AN ‘ANALYTICAL
1
ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF MEXICO

MATRIX’

Amaya Alvez*

I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 20th century, Latin America presented a conundrum concerning the role
of judiciaries as a branch of government and, in particular, their protection of the population’s
fundamental rights. Throughout post-independence Latin America in the 1800s’, judiciaries were
constructed as mechanical ‘law appliers’ allowing them to adjudicate rights in a constrained,
highly formalist approach to the law. The textualist system of interpretation ended up neglecting
the very nature of the constitution as the fundamental or supreme legal text that contains the
political and legal accords to rule a certain society. With the existence of political subrepresentation under ‘democratic covers’ and a strong Spanish monarchical heritage, the result
was a judicial system traditionally deficient in its protection of fundamental rights. Decisions
were only grounded in positive laws that failed to provide accountability and deepened the
democratic deficit of the judiciary as a branch of government.2 Arguably, the main challenge was
the judiciary’s own understanding as to their role and that of the courts within a democratic
political system. One line of reasoning advanced in this article explains that judges possessed a
deferential attitude in human rights adjudication through the misuse of rule-like adjudication
mechanisms, called subsumption, when constitutional rights are considered to be rules. The
preference for such a method of legal argumentation is rooted in the formalism of the civil law
tradition and the search for certainty and predictability in the role of judges as merely ‘law
appliers.’ 3 The downside of its use at the constitutional level in the Latin American context was
that judgments became mechanical and poorly reasoned and did not take into account all relevant
factors from political, social, cultural and economic perspectives.
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Faculty of Juridical and Social Studies, School of Law, University of
Concepción, Chile; PhD candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada.
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I am indebted for the thoughtful comments of the members of the Toronto Group Workshop and to the participants
of the Agora Academy 2009 at LSE in which a draft of this paper was presented. I highly appreciated editorial
advice received from professors Shin Imai and Jennifer Nedelsky.

2

For a general description on the Spanish government in America see: JAVIER BARRIENTOS, EL GOBIERNO DE LAS
INDIAS [THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT] (MARCIAL PONS- FUNDACION RAFAEL DEL PINO 2005).
3

An important factor to bear in mind throughout this paper is the legal tradition in all Latin America called the Civil
Law Tradition, in contrast with the common law tradition. Differences exist mainly in the historical understanding
of the nature of law and the role law played in society and its political organization. The Civil Law Tradition is the
older and the more widely distributed on earth. Authors like John Merryman fixed the date of its origin in 450 B.C.,
the date of the publication of the Twelve Tables in Rome. It is the dominant legal tradition in Europe, all Latin
America, part of Asia and Africa and even enclaves in the common law world like Quebec in Canada and Puerto
Rico and Louisiana in the United States. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (3RD ED. 2007)
(STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2007).
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Proportionality, as an alternative way to adjudicate rights, is considered part of the
transformation of constitutional law in the second half of the 20th century. Proportionality
analysis is presented as a conceptual framework, an analytical methodology, and a legal
construction that defines the relationship between human rights and considerations that may
justify their limitation in a democracy.4 Nevertheless, as a standards-based mechanism that seeks
direct application of background justifications to the search for a stronger form of judicial
discretion, proportionality analysis has intensified the debate regarding judicial power. As a
balancing mechanism, it is seen as the threshold applied to a state action that will first seek to
interpret the scope of a constitutional right and then places limitations upon it at the subconstitutional level. Whether or not the measure adopted is justified is based upon the
relationship between the means used and the aims pursued by the state act through an analysis of
the legality and legitimacy of its content.

II. THE RULE-BASED WAY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
IN LATIN AMERICA
The Latin America method chosen to solve disagreements about rights was a rule-based
system of adjudication. Robert Alexy presents this system as an approach that considers rules as
definitive commands that ‘contain fixed points in the field of the factually and legally possible.’5
The latter is based upon the idea that legal validity does not accept degrees and, therefore, a legal
rule is either fulfilled or not.6 Judges confronted with such a system must use the traditional
canons of interpretation to solve questions connected with the application of constitutional rights,
including grammatical, historical or systematic elements. The objective is to provide greater
certainty in the outcome and ensure that the constitution and the norms contained in it are
considered to be rules to provide legal predictability. However, the complexity of constitutional
rights, as a particular form of legal norms, does not allow them to be considered solely as rules
(an argument that will be developed further in this paper). The normative solution created to
overcome the collision of rules is that of ‘categorization’. A conflict between rules can only be
solved through a formal exception, implying that one of the rules will not be applied or will be
4

AHARON BARAK, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, ANNUAL LECTURE IN LAW AND SOCIETY,
THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND SOCIETY IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE LAW FACULTY AND CENTRE FOR
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES, OXFORD UNIVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS: THE ROLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY (JUNE 4, 2009). Available at http://www.fljs.org
5 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 48 (JULIAN RIVERS TRANS. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS,
2002).
6

MATTIAS KUMM, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS PRINCIPLES: ON THE STRUCTURE AND DOMAIN OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE, 2 (3) I.CON 574-96 (2004) (discussing the relevance of Alexy’s work through a review essay on his book
‘A Theory of Constitutional Rights’).
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declared invalid. Categorization imposes a hierarchy upon rights with one rule regarded as
superior to the exclusion of another.
Subsumption, as the mechanism used by judges to apply rules, is a deductive formula where
the legal judgment follows logically from the description of the case and the existence of a
norm.7 As John Merryman described it, “[t]he whole process of judicial decision is made to lift
into the formal syllogism of scholastic logic. The major premise is in the statute, the facts of the
case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows.”8 The use of subsumption
as the sole mechanism to solve collisions between constitutional rights is seen as problematic by
Robert Alexy. This is based on the belief that this deductive structure does not take into account
all of the relevant factors at stake. Secondly, he claims that the legal and factual premise used to
construct the formula should also be justified.9
Frederick Schauer offers a more positive account by claiming that subsumption, as a rights
adjudication mechanism, is closer to the formality of the law than balancing. He describes
subsumption as ‘largely constrained, largely textually interpretative, and largely characterized by
the way in which the constraints of a moderate clear text, exclude numerous factors and
considerations that would be otherwise relevant.’10 For Schauer, the extent to which the
deductive formal structure of subsumption constrains the decision-makers [judges] is an
empirical inquiry dependent upon the availability of choices, the level of binding to the rules at
stake, and the formal and linguistic range of choices allowed by that legal rule.11
In Latin America, the use of subsumption as a formal logical structure to solve conflicts
between constitutional rights resulted in the courts imposing a hierarchy of values and
identifying the higher value in the hierarchy in any given case. Although it is acceptable for a
hierarchy to be constructed between guaranteed constitutional rights in a constitutional setting
and, as a rule-based system, can provide greater certainty to the outcome when adequately
constructed, these decisions can be negatively critiqued. The decisions (a) were poorly reasoned
with rare reference to, or argumentation on, the substantive content of the rights involved (a
discussion that would construct the preferred hierarchy), the scope of the rights protected by the
constitution, the extent of legal protection that the rights will have in the legal system, and the
possibility and standard to which rights could be limited; (b) made no interrelation between the
rights, with no acceptance that constitutional rights can collide nor how to solve these collisions;
and (c) contained no reasoning as to whether a modification of the factual data would affect the
result of the case.
7

ROBERT ALEXY, ON BALANCING AND SUBSUMPTION. A STRUCTURAL COMPARISON, 16 (4) RATIO JURIS, 433, 43435 (DECEMBER 2003).
8

MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 3, at 36.
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ALEXY, supra note 7, at 435.
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FREDERICK SCHAUER, BALANCING, SUBSUMPTION, AND THE CONSTRAINING ROLE OF LEGAL TEXT (FEBRUARY 18,
2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403343
11

SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 15.
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I propose that the use of subsumption in Latin America, combined with the postindependence conception of the judiciary and the influential Spanish heritage, encouraged the
judiciary to remain detached from the social-political process, marginalized judges from the
social changes that occurred, and promoted minimal judicial discretion with failure to account
for decisions adopted.

III. THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE
OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
Another way to adjudicate constitutional rights and to construct limitations upon them is the
use of proportionality analysis presented as a judicially-created doctrine of constitutional law. In
other words, proportionality analysis is a way to assess the conformity of laws with
constitutional norms with special attention to rights. Proportionality analysis is considered a
methodological criterion or standard, generally understood as being when ‘state power may
encroach upon individual freedom only to the extent that it is indispensable for the protection of
the public interest’.12 The underlying idea is that measures adopted by authorities should not
exceed the limits of what is considered appropriate and necessary in order to obtain
constitutionally legitimate aims in the name of society.
The difference between subsumption and proportionality can be presented as part of a
broader debate between rules and standards.13 Authors, like Frederick Schauer, have argued that
standards-like proportionality systems and rule-based systems will converge towards a rule-like
structure as it matures, provided by the example of the method of adjudication under the First
Amendment in the United States.14 This contention can be challenged based on the spread of the
standard-based proportionality analysis in the last 50 years. The German Basic Law of 1949
established the parameters of a limitation to a fundamental right. This was pursued by a
reflective adoption in 1965 where the German Constitutional Court anchored the principle of
proportionality in the Rule of Law and considered it to be an unwritten principle of constitutional
law.15 For Alec Stone and Jud Mathews, the adoption of proportionality in Germany during the
late 1950’s occurred because of the structure of constitutional rights adopted in the 1949
Fundamental Law and the Civil Legal Tradition. This is in contrast to modern thinking where the
strongest argument for upholding proportionality as the main rights adjudication doctrine is

12

NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 23
(KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL EDITIONS, 1996).
13

PIERRE SCHLAG, RULES AND STANDARDS, 33 UCLA LAW REVIEW, 379, 379-430 (1985-1986).

14

FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE CONVERGENCE OF RULES AND STANDARDS, N.Z. L. REV. 303, 303-28 (2003).

15

BVerfG Dec. 15, 1965 BVerfGE 19, 342 (348-349).
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based in the rationality of its structure and the outcomes as a real guarantee of constitutional
rights.16
Following the development of proportionality within German constitutional law, the
principle was then adopted by many European countries and by the European Union.17 Other
countries, like Canada,18 have used the proportionality analysis since the 1980s. After spreading
in Europe, it was adopted more recently in Latin America by countries like Colombia19 in the
1990s and México20 in 2007. The authors claim that, by the end of the 1990s, every effective
system of constitutional adjudication in the world, with the exception of the United States, had
embraced the main tenets of proportionality analysis.21
The use of proportionality analysis assumes an active role for judges in constitutional
adjudication and the consideration of constitutional rights as a particular set of legal norms,
whether that be principles or rules. For Alec Stone and Jud Mathews, constitutional judges
employ proportionality to achieve two goals; to ‘manage potentially explosive environments,
given the politically sensitive nature of rights review, and to establish and reinforce the salience
of constitutional deliberation and adjudication within the great political system.’22 This is also
developed by Simon Evans and Adrienne Stone claiming proportionality as a standards-based
technique that resists resorting to rules. The explanation offered by these authors is based upon
the example provided by Canada with the use of proportionality analysis based on Section 1 of
the Charter and the ‘Canadian Legal Culture’. The argument is that the application of
proportionality analysis, as a judicially-made flexible doctrine, can be anchored in the Canadian
openness to contemplate foreign laws and the practice of comparative constitutional law by
scholars and, most significantly, the courts.23 The analysis of constitutional rights and its
limitations requires the involvement of all branches of government bringing relevance to the
16

ALEC STONE SWEET & JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY BALANCING AND GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 97-111 (2008-2009) .
17

About proportionality analysis in Europe see: EVELYN ELLIS, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS
OF EUROPE (HART PUBLISHING, 1999) AND NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 1996).
18

The leading case is R. V. OAKES [1986] S.C.J. Nº 7; [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 for a treatment of its evolution see SUJIT
CHOUDHRY, SO WHAT IS THE REAL LEGACY OF OAKES? TWO DECADES OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS UNDER THE
CANADIAN CHARTERS’S SECTION 1, 34 S.C.L.R. (2ND), 501-535 (2006).
19

For a comprehensive study of the use of the proportionality principle in Colombia see: CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO,
EL DERECHO DE LOS DERECHOS (3RD ED. UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA, 2006).
20

The ‘juicio de amparo en revisión 1659/2006’ decided by the Supreme Court of Mexico in 2007 introduced
formally the principle of proportionality as a‘analytical matrix’ as the judges called it.
21

STONE & MATHEWS, supra note 16, at 77-79

22

STONE & MATHEWS, supra note 16, at 87.

23

SIMON EVANS & ADRIENNE STONE, BALANCING AND PROPORTIONALITY: A DISTINCTIVE ETHIC?, PAPER
PRESENTED AT THE VII WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
ATHENS, 11-15 JUNE, 2007. Available at http://www.enelsyn.gr/en/workshops/workshop15(en).htm
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notion of ‘dialogue’ between the courts and legislature.24 A reason offered is the particular
understanding of the way in which the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature
should be driven, as an example Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell consider proportionality
analysis as one way in which a dialogue between parliament and the court can occur.25
The other important element to take into consideration is the way in which proportionality
analysis structures a relationship between constitutional principles and rules articulated as
constitutional rights, and balances the individual interest with the collective one. Robert Alexy
conceptualizes constitutional rights as principles which ‘require that something be realized to the
greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities.’26 Therefore, principles appear to
contain an open possibility of what is legally and factually available which, in my opinion, is one
of the characteristics that makes proportionality attractive. Principles are considered prima facie
reasons for norms and are never definitive. From Alexy’s perspective, conflicts between two
principles can only be resolved through balancing in a specific context because principles can be
satisfied to varying degrees. The purpose of balancing is to resolve conflicts between principles,
but it also provides assistance to state organs to optimize rights properly. Presented with two
colliding principles, the solution is provided through weighing the particular circumstances of
the case. Neither principle will be regarded as pre-eminent with the result being dependent upon
the context. A collision between two principles is solved by establishing a ‘conditional relation
of precedence’ between the principles in light of the circumstances of the case. Different
principles will prevail under different circumstances. Robert Alexy offers a first “law of
competing principles” as part of his theory of principles where, “[t]he circumstances under which
one principle takes precedence over another constitute the conditions of a rule which has the
same legal consequences as the principle taking precedence.”27 The resulting consequence is that
a constitutional right will be considered as a principle at first sight but, following the
consideration of the legal and factual circumstances and the competing principles, it will only be
transformed into a rule valid in some cases. Therefore, balancing of principles produces rules
through proportionality analysis. When a constitutional court transforms a principle into a rule, it
is a judicial attempt to declare what the constitution stipulates in that particular setting. However,
principles remain vivid and demanding in the background of the rule decided through
precedence.
A further element is the relationship between the global and the local. Part of the
attractiveness of proportionality analysis is its ability to be used as a descriptive tool for rights
24

This has been extensively discussed in Canada see PETER HOGG & ALLISON BUSHELL, THE CHARTER DIALOGUE
BETWEEN COURTS AND LEGISLATURE (OR PERHAPS THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS ISN’T SUCH A BAD THING AFTER ALL), 35
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL, 75 (1997) and the updated version PETER HOGG, ALLISON BUSHELL & WADE
WRIGHT, “CHARTER DIALOGUE REVISITED – OR ‘MUCH ADO ABOUT METAPHORS” 45 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL,
1 (2007).
25

PETER HOGG & ALLISON BUSHELL, THE CHARTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN COURTS AND LEGISLATURE (OR PERHAPS
THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS ISN’T SUCH A BAD THING AFTER ALL), 35 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL, 75, 82 (1997).
26

ALEXY, supra note 5, at 48.

27

ALEXY, supra note 5, at 54.
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adjudication claims. Proportionality allows consideration of real situations and not simply
abstract arguments or public policy discussion. Supporters of proportionality analysis focus upon
a case-by-case analysis that creates space for a public conversation about the concept, structure
and normative force of fundamental rights. David Beatty presents proportionality as a principled,
pragmatic and, therefore, legitimate review process. He sees proportionality as a response to
various constitutional problems, arguing that, “on a shrinking planet, [proportionality] is
appropriately multicultural. It structures an integration of the real and the ideal, the local and the
universal, by integrating a fundamental principle of distributive justice into each community’s
understanding of itself.”28 Proportionality is presented as a formal framework of analysis that
orientates judges as to how to organize and evaluate conflicting factual claims that are made
about the laws they are asked to review. A flip side of Beatty’s approach is Vicki Jackson’s
critique of his argument. She says that prior questions about the degree and tradition of legal
protection accorded to different individual rights, and the institutional roles of non-judicial
decision-makers, have not been acknowledged in Beatty’s account.29 For Jackson, the differences
in outcome are not due to different interpretative methodologies of the courts but rather
sociological understanding of the relationship between law and society in that particular
constitutional order. Jackson underlines the advantages of proportionality analysis as being the
increase in transparency of judicial decision-making by the creation of a framework or structure,
the attention paid not only to the individual interests at stake but also to governmental
justifications, and the attention paid to particular facts transforming proportionality into a more
flexible tool of adjudication. For Jackson, proportionality is a relevant tool in constitutional
adjudication but, at the same time, she believes that it is necessary to remember that constitutions
serve a number of purposes and that those principles, values and rights are protected with
consideration of the particular characteristics of a polity. Therefore, her invitation is to combine
proportionality with institutional considerations in a State-by-State analysis.30
At a national level, proportionality analysis assists in the creation of an open framework
for the judge, where the normative content of a particular fundamental right must be constructed.
From my perspective, proportionality as a tool for constitutional adjudication is an invitation for
judges to argue the fundamental social agreements considered in the constitution. Moreover,
proportionality used in an ordered form can assist judges by structuring their decisions, provide
transparency in the legal reasoning used and, as a consequence, allow a better public engagement
with judicial arguments which, finally, improves the accountability of the judiciary as a branch
of government.

28

DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 168 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2004).

29

VICKI C. JACKSON, BEING PROPORTIONAL ABOUT PROPORTIONALITY 21 CONST. COMMENT., 803, 821 (2004)
(book review of ‘The Ultimate Rule of Law’ by David Beatty).
30

JACKSON, supra note 29, at 859.
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IV. THE ADOPTION OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AS RIGHTS
ADJUDICATION DOCTRINE IN MEXICO
The ‘juicio de amparo en revisión 1659/2006’ decided by the Supreme Court of Mexico in
2007 formally introduced the principle of proportionality as an ‘analytical matrix’ in rights
adjudication claims.31 The case involved a young soldier called Esteban Cabrera who was
dismissed from the military after being diagnosed as being HIV positive. The case was presented
as a constitutional collision between the societal interest, represented by the constitutional
principle of capacity of the military forces to carry out their duties and the integrity of its
members and, on the other side, the individual interest of Esteban Cabrera based on his
guarantees of equality and non-discrimination grounded on health reasons. Dismissal from the
military as a consequence of a positive test had been established by statute through the law
governing the social security system of the Mexican armed forces.32 The declaration written in
Esteban Cabrera’s medical certificate was ‘useless or incompetent in the second category’ with
the effect being his compulsory retirement from the armed forces. Because he had only served
six years, he did not receive a pension or health coverage after his retirement.
In February 2007, the Supreme Court of Mexico, as the adjudicating court in
constitutional cases, used proportionality analysis as the chosen mechanism to overcome the
constitutional collision at stake. The case was presented as the limitation imposed on the
individual right of Esteban Cabrera to equality and non-discrimination, grounded on health
reasons and his HIV status, in order to allow the full protection of the societal interest in having
efficient military forces. The issue before the Court was whether the law concerning the social
security system of the Mexican armed forces, approved in 2003, represented a reasonable and
proportional limitation to the constitutional rights of equality (Article 4º) and non-discrimination
based on health reasons (Article 1º) of Esteban Cabrera. The Supreme Court accepted that the
law was disproportionate and, therefore, unconstitutional. As a consequence, Esteban Cabrera
was reinstated to his position prior to the proceedings as an active member of the armed forces
and was to receive all of the legal benefits related with this declaration (for example, an income
and health coverage).
The preliminary question that the majority decision had to examine, as the first step of
proportionality analysis, was whether the state action pursued a constitutionally legitimate aim
capable of justifying a limitation upon human rights. The term ‘margin of appreciation’ was first
developed by the European Court of Human Rights to refer to the room given to the political
representatives of signatory countries in order to fulfil their obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Over time, the term has been extended to refer to the discretion
31

This is a legal mechanism created by the Mexican Constitution in order to claim that state acts in general and
legislative acts in particular violated constitutional guarantees.
32

Law of the ‘Instituto de Seguridad Social para las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas,’ published at the Official Gazette
on July 9th, 2003, [Hereinafter ISSFAM law.]
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national courts permit the executive and, primarily, legislature to exercise with regard to the
scope of legal protection each constitutional right will enjoy in a given legal order. Critics have
argued that this approach could be used by courts deferential towards national political
representatives to avoid the implementation of international standards of enforcement of human
rights.33
Through this first step, the Supreme Court of Mexico examined whether the law
governing the social security system of the Mexican armed forces [ISSFAM law] had a
constitutionally legitimate aim in dismissing a member of the Armed Forces as a consequence of
being HIV positive. The Court established that the law had a constitutionally legitimate aim in
ensuring the efficency of the military forces and protecting the integrity of its members. Justice
Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz did say that the efficiency of the Armed Forces could be challenged as
a principle of the Mexican constitutional order. Unfortunately, for the sake of the argument
developed in this paper, this opinion was published as a personal opinion in a Mexican magazine
and not within the judgment.34 Justice Cossio argues that articles 4, 13, 31, 32, 123 part B, XIII
and 129 of the 1917 Constitution treats subjects as different by permitting the existence of
Military Tribunals, establishing the armed forces as mandatory, requiring serving members to
have been born in Mexico, and creating a special system of social welfare for its members.
Therefore, this makes it impossible to derive the existence of a constitutional principle ‘of
capacity of the military forces to carry out their duties and the integrity of its members’ that
could eventually be balanced against other principles. From his perspective, these articles regard
the Armed Forces from an organizational perspective without considering it as protectors of the
institutional order as suggested by the judges in the dissenting opinion.35 One of the positive
features of proportionality analysis instead of subsumption was that the judgement began a
discussion about the constitutional principles of the Mexican legal order. As a concrete example,
the role of the Armed Forces is one of the issues in which the Latin America constitutional
context must be carefully analysed. Therefore, the public discussion generated as to the validity
of a constitutional principle concerning the efficacy of the Armed Forces and its evolution since
the 1917 Revolution when the Constitution was drafted and adopted in Mexico, is an important
issue. This is one of the features of proportionality analysis as a rights adjudication doctrine that
deals with principles considered open legal norms and, as a consequence, allows a broader
debate about their content.
The second step of proportionality analysis is the presence of a rational connection
between the means and the ends of the statute. The question is whether the declaration of
‘useless or incompetent in the second category’ when a soldier is diagnosed as being HIV
33

EYAL BENVENISTI, MARGIN OF APPRECIATION, CONSENSUS AND UNIVERSAL STANDARDS, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT’ L. L. &
POL., 843 (1999).
34

JOSÉ RAMÓN COSSIO DÍAZ, MILITARES CON VIH: CONTRA LA DISCRIMINACIÓN, 364 REVISTA NEXOS (APRIL
2008). Available at http://www.nexos.com.mx
35

The dissent opinion underlines that the Armed Forces not only ensures the national security but also the internal
security of the Mexican state and it has a role to play in order to overcome emergency situations.
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positive, and the consequential dismissal from the Armed Forces, is suitable in advancing the
goal of the legitimate policy. This is an empirical question. It is suitable if it actually furthers the
declared policy goal of the government. in this particular case, it is the efficacy of the military
forces and the protection of the integrity of its members. The Supreme Court of Mexico
established that the means used to achieve the aim of this law were inappropriate. The scientific
and medical evidence proved that the immediate consequence of being considered useless or
incompetent to work after being diagnosed as being HIV positive is wrong and, moreover, does
not further any Mexican public health policy with regards to HIV. In order to provide a solid
argument, the Supreme Court of Mexico alluded to the official public policy subscribed by the
Mexican Government in order to prevent and control infections of HIV in the population.36 The
Court also invoked international documents relating to the prevention and treatment of HIV
infections such as the “Rights and Humanity Declaration and Charter on HIV and AIDS” and the
“Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS.”37 The real novelty of this judgement in the
Latin American constitutional context, and a demonstration of one of the positive features of
proportionality analysis as a judicial tool for rights adjudication, was the role given to medical
and scientific data as extrinsic evidence. The Court requested information about HIV and AIDS
from two experts of the ‘National Scientific Academy of Mexico’.38 The report of the two
experts included information regarding the period in which the infected person fails to show
symptoms, the dangers of transmission and the necessity of educational campaigns in order to
reduce misinformation, prejudice and a culture of discrimination against individuals diagnosed as
HIV positive. The legal consideration of this information could have been premised under two
methods. One option was its consideration under the traditional parameter of evidence rules,
where only the facts are at stake. Alternatively, it may be considered in the adoption of a new
perspective contemplating proportionality analysis as a mechanism where the scientific
perspective informs the judge and permits them to decide whether there is a rational connection
between the means used by the law and the ends pursued. The argument here is that the existence
of proportionality analysis instead of subsumption, as a rule-based mechanism, allowed the court
to better deal with unforeseen facts, like the medical evidence either not known or ignored at the
time when the statute was enacted by the Mexican legislature.
The third step, called the least drastic means element, requires that the statute must impair,
damage, or harm the right as little as possible. In this case, an examination of the objective of the
statute may determine the concrete situation to ascertain the most reasonable option that would
least damage the right. However, judges may be required to collect information, supporting the
view that proportionality analysis is a dialogue between the courts, political representatives and
36
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wider society. In cases where an alternative measure would achieve the same goal with less
infringement of the right, the initial measure must be declared unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it
is important to acknowledge that the legislature has a margin of appreciation to decide between
different measures to achieve a goal. The main problems the Court must decide upon will appear
when the end-result of the legislation is uncertain, unclear or dependent upon future events.
Through this step, the present case posed a more difficult question as to whether a soldier
is ‘useless or incompetent’ after being diagnosed as being HIV positive and if the enforced
retirement from the armed forces is necessary. A measure is only necessary if there is no less
restrictive, but equally effective, measure available to achieve the intended policy goal. The third
step established that the law and the differentiation imposed in it were disproportionate because
there were alternative methods where limitations upon the fundamental principles at stake
(equality and non-discrimination based on health reasons) could have been better protected for
Esteban Cabrera. One alternative solution would have been to move the soldier to a new
administrative function inside the military forces.
The fourth step in proportionality analysis requires a proper relationship to be
established between the means and the goals of the statute. This step is called ‘proportionality in
a narrow sense’ and is focused upon balancing the factual limitation of the human right infringed
and the attainment of the statute’s objective. Rather than being a comparison, it weighs the
impact upon the individual if the infringements are effective against the impact upon the societal
interest if the measure is not adopted. Its importance has been challenged. Even supporters of
proportionality analysis do not agree about its importance and its role in the balancing formula as
a whole. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2007 in Canada (Attorney General) v.
JTI-Macdonald Corporation, defended the importance of the fourth step of proportionality
analysis by saying that: “Although cases are most often resolved on the issue of minimal
impairment, the final inquiry into proportionality of effects is essential. It is the only place where
the attainment of the objective may be weighed against the impact on the right. If rational
connection and minimal impairment were to be met, and the analysis was to end there, the result
might be to uphold a severe impairment on a right in the face of a less important objective.”39
As a former judge of the German Constitutional Court, Dieter Grimm defends the central
role of the fourth step of proportionality analysis by saying that this is the way in which to give
full effect to fundamental rights and ensuring care as to what is allocated to each side of the
scale. It is logical to assume that a comparison is required between the advantages and
disadvantages of the objectives pursued and the limitations placed upon particular constitutional
rights. Grimm describes this step as being a comparison between the losses to the infringed right
if the law is upheld and the losses to the value protected by the law if the fundamental right
prevails. For Grimm, the analysis is a contextual one and, therefore, can involve accusations of
courts behaving as ‘policy makers.’40
39
40
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It is important to highlight the conflict between proportionality based on an analytical
structure and the problem of incommensurability in balancing, as one of the most typical
critiques of balancing.41 Aleinikoff describes this challenge as being the difficulty in identifying
a common currency that allows balancing with the same scale values when constitutional
principles are certainly different.42 The response provided by Robert Alexy is that the issue at
stake in proportionality analysis is not ‘direct comparability’. What is at stake is the existence of
elements that allow a comparison, as proportionality assesses each principle in comparison with
the ideal for that legal order. Therefore, the relevant question considers the seriousness of and
harm caused by the infringement of each principle in respect to the core essence of that right in
that particular constitutional setting. For Alexy the common point of view to solve the collision
between rights is provided by the constitution.43 For Barak the common base for comparison is
provided by the societal margin of importance of a given human right.44
In the current case, the fourth step of ‘Proportionality stricto senso’ analyzed whether the
increase in operational effectiveness of the armed forces by prohibiting HIV infected individuals
from serving was balanced, justified and proportionate by the degree of interference in the
applicant’s right to equality and non-discrimination based on health reasons. The Supreme Court
of Mexico considered the law to be disproportionate. The examination at this step included
following Alexy’s weight formula. First, an assessment as to the intensity of interference of the
principles at stake (the interference with the efficacy of the Mexican armed forces) was
considered minimal by the majority. On the contrary, the interference with the right to equality
and non discrimination based on health reasons of Esteban Cabrera was considered serious.
Second, the concrete weight of the potentially-violated principles concluded that the medical
evidence and the public policy interest in fostering a non-discriminatory culture made it obvious
that the principle of equality and non-discrimination had a higher weight in the Mexican legal
order. The debate as to the actual existence of the principle of military efficacy also proved that
this is a principle with lower weight in this particular factual situation.
The alternative normative solution provided to overcome collisions in such constitutional
cases in Latin America has been categorization, a rule-based system, with one of the principles
having superiority in the hierarchy of rights to the exclusion of the other. The dissenting opinion
in this case represented this adjudication mechanism. The main problem with categorization, as
an adjudication technique, is that it gives absolute preference to one of the constitutional rights at
stake. As an example, the dissenting opinion claimed that the prevailing constitutional right
should have been the efficiency of the armed forces without consideration of the other possible
41
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constitutional rights in collision, namely the right to equality and non-discrimination based on
health reasons of Esteban Cabrera.45 This resulted in an intense public debate with the dissenting
judges being accused of deciding the case based on their prejudices, of being ignorant by
refusing to accept scientific and medical evidence regarding HIV, and having disregard for
international treaties signed by Mexico. 46

V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
First, we should acknowledge that proportionality analysis is a complex analytical method
that would demand many considerations by the courts. This would include; judicial enquiry into
constitutional history, knowledge about the actual standpoint of the social agreements
consecrated in the constitution, a vast expertise about the public policies implemented by the
government, a serious commitment to international obligations assumed by the state, and
important engagement in extensive constitutional comparative studies. The idea of the legitimacy
of comparative studies, although extremely interesting, is outside the scope of this paper. I
believe that courts, by applying proportionality analysis even in this structured analytical form,
are engaged in substantive value choices. Arguments contrary to this, like those developed by
David Beatty suggesting that the method is neutral and driven by facts claiming that ‘judges have
no say on the worth of what is put on each side of the balance’, are problematic in my opinion.47
Beatty thinks that pragmatism does a better job because facts are seen as better sources to decide
cases as they have certainty, predictability and reality that permits a technique based on
measurements and analysis.48 This approach using factual data is problematic because it is
important to consider that judicial discretion not only involves the interpretation of legal norms,
but entails the interpretation of facts as highlighted by Kim Lane Scheppele.49 I think that the
factual perspective empowers the role of judges in the proportionality analysis; however,
interpretation by judges is a misuse of judicial discretion. Discretion is about making choices and
acknowledging the principles valid in their society. Obviously, this is the great challenge judges
are confronted with but I do not see how a factual analysis or the proportionality technique could
avoid this step.
Second, it remains to be answered why the efforts of the Mexican Supreme Court were
directed at proving that balancing had always been part of the Mexican adjudication system and
45
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that proportionality analysis in its structured four steps form did not represent a new
methodology in rights adjudication claims. The reasons to reject adopting proportionality
through a migration could include the fear of judicial activism in a system that traditionally left
less room for judicial power and claims to the erosion of a state’s sovereignty. This can be
regarded as a strategic move to render the adoption of the principle of proportionality successful
in the Mexican juridical order, partially avoiding the problems associated with the migration of
constitutional mechanisms.50 Nevertheless, it is important to demonstrate awareness of the
challenges posed by the migration of such a mechanism. Sujit Choudhry devoted an entire
volume of essays to examine the actual challenges of the migration of constitutional ideas.51 Neil
Walker argued in the same volume that migration leaves the door open to the adoption and
adaptation of the ‘recipient’ legal country and does not connote ownership of the contributor.52
Objections to courts engaging with foreign ideas are currently being debated in the
constitutional realm with concerns normally expressed as to the implications on state
sovereignty. This short-sighted perspective has recently been challenged through a conceptual
and theoretical shift of perspectives in constitutionalism.53 Paradoxically, proportionality
analysis is structured in a way that considers the local legal context relevant and values its
influence in the balancing operation at stake.
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